Central bank independence and inflation: the case of Greece. by Theodore Panagiotidis (7195634) & Afroditi Triampella (7195778)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository by the 
author and is made available under the following Creative Commons Licence 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND INFLATION:  
THE CASE OF GREECE 
 
 
Theodore Panagiotidis*, 
Department of Economics, 
Loughborough University, UK 
 t.panagiotidis@lboro.ac.uk 
Afroditi Triampella, 
Panteion University, Greece 
 
 
 
Abstract 
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between the variability of inflation and CBI were also investigated. Furthermore, 
evidence was found to suggest that the rate of turnover Granger causes inflation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Central bank independence (CBI) has become one of the central concepts in monetary 
theory and policy. It is widely believed that a high level of CBI with an explicit mandate 
for the bank to restrain inflation are important institutional devices to assure price 
stability. Although one could suggest alternative mechanisms to reach low rates of 
inflation, CBI is the one most often recommended. Indeed, more and more countries in 
the OECD and beyond have recently changed their central bank laws accordingly. The 
theory underlying this view is the time inconsistency model by Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). The basic message of this argument is that 
governments suffer from an inflationary bias and as a result inflation is suboptimal. 
Rogoff (1985) has proposed delegating monetary policy to an independent and 
‘conservative’ central banker to reduce this inflationary bias. Conservative means that the 
central banker is more averse to inflation than the government, in the sense that the 
former places a greater weight on price stability than the government does. 
There is a lot of empirical evidence suggesting that countries with more independent 
central banks have lower rates of inflation. This evidence generally consists of cross-
country regressions using proxies for CBI based on the statutes of the central bank and 
the turnover rate of central bank governors. Berger et al. (2001) provide an up-to-date 
literature review on this issue. They conclude that the negative relationship between CBI 
and inflation is quite robust.  
 
On the other hand Hayo and Hefeker (2001) survey critically the argument for CBI and 
argue that CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for reaching monetary stability. Other 
critics include Goodhart (1994) and Forder (1998) who question this approach. The latter 
points out that: ”The test might appear to show a statistical regularity, say between the 
content of the statutes of a central bank and the rate of inflation, but in the absence of a 
theoretical connection that would be of no interest. We might note that the European 
German-speaking countries (Germany, Switzerland, and Austria) have low inflation. This 
does not mean that if we all started speaking German, inflation would fall”. A technical 
criticism of the structure of various CBI indices can be found in Mangano (1998). 
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Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992), CWN hereafter, and Cukierman (1994) 
summarise the empirical regularities in the correlation between CBI on the one hand and 
inflation and economic growth on the other as follows: 
1. Among industrial countries, the legal CBI index introduced in CWN is negatively 
correlated with inflation, but the turnover rate (TOR) of central governors has no 
correlation with inflation. 
2. Among developing countries, the legal CBI index of CWN is not correlated with 
inflation, but the TOR is significantly related to inflation. 
 
A number of authors such as CWN and Grilli, Masciandro and Tabellini (1991), GMT 
hereafter, have undertaken different types of research for a number of countries, 
including Greece, correlating CBI with various macroeconomic variables. Following a 
cross-section analysis, they found that more independence for the central bank is 
systematically associated with lower average inflation and less variable inflation. In GMT 
(1991), Greece is categorized as an industrial country and in CWN as developing. In this 
paper we investigate which categorization is justified and compare the results with the 
findings of CWN for industrialized and developing countries. 
 
A time series approach is followed (for a different time series approach see also Otero 
and Ramirez, 2005 where inflation is modeled in terms of disequilibria in the monetary 
sector, the foreign sector and the labor sector).. The purpose is to highlight and 
investigate the relationship between CBI and inflation in the Greek economy over the last 
five decades using up to date data. This would be the last data available since Greece 
joined the EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) and the Central Bank (CB) participates 
in the European Central Bank (ECB). We update the legal index constructed by CWN 
and investigate whether the institutional setup of the CB makes a difference as far as 
inflation is concerned. Additionally, we study whether the stylized facts reported by 
CWN and GMT are justified. 
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The paper is organized as follows. A brief historic note is presented in Section 2. Section 
3 describes the methods used to construct the Legal index for CBI, the turnover of the 
Central Bank governor and the inflation variable. The results of the empirical analysis are 
presented in Section 4 where we test whether or not CBI can explain the behaviour of 
inflation and its variability in Greece, and whether or not there is Granger causality 
between the two variables in concern. The last section concludes. 
 
2. BRIEF HISTORY 
 
The Bank of Greece was founded on the 15th of September 1927 according to the Geneva 
Protocol, but it actually began operating on the 14th of May 1928. Although the Statute of 
the Bank of Greece has been repeatedly amended, the traditional operational framework 
changed only recently (December 1997). 
 
Following liberation from occupation in 1944 and the civil war, Greece’s political and 
economic life was characterised by uncertainty and instability. From 1945 to 1953 five 
devaluations of the drachma against the dollar took place and at least four stabilisation 
policies were introduced without being able to accomplish stability and low inflation. In 
1953 a new monetary stabilisation programme was proposed which included the 
introduction of the new drachma (equal to 1000 “old” drachmas), the participation in the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and a 50% devaluation against the dollar 
and all the currencies that were connected to it. The devaluation and the participation in 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rate, helped to maintain the rate of 30 
drachmas per dollar and a low inflation until 1973. Monetary policy decisions were taken 
by the Currency Committee, which was formed in 1946. This was a powerful body whose 
mission was to control money supply, interest rates, the drachma exchange rate and the 
business credit. The President of the Committee was the Minister of Coordination 
(responsible for the Economy) and whose members included the Ministers of Finance 
(responsible for the Budget), Industry, Commerce and Agriculture and the Governor of 
the Bank of Greece (BoG). The policy guidelines laid by the Currency Committee was 
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expected to be followed by the BoG and its governor was expected to resign when a new 
government was in office.  
 
Overall, the period between 1953-73, characterised as the “Golden” period of the 
drachma by Alogoskoufis and Lazaretou (1997), has been seen as a period of monetary 
stability and low inflation. On the one hand the participation in the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates kept inflationary pressures low and allowed the monetary 
authorities to control inflation. On the other hand, the autocratic state exercised tight 
control over labour cost (trade unions were allowed to operate only in 1982), which 
resulted in low increases in wages following broadly the increases in productivity. 
 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system (1972) and the first oil shock (1974) coincided 
with the transition to democracy (1974). Greece did not participate in the following 
European attempts for monetary cooperation and exchange rate stability. The Currency 
Committee and the BoG continue to aim at a high growth rate, high level of employment 
and investment, a sustainable current account deficit and in the same time trying to meet 
the financial needs of the public sector.  The persisting high inflation of the period 1974-5 
obliged the authorities to control the liquidity of the economy. As a result, in 1976 the 
Currency Committee introduced for the first time intermediate targets for the conduct of 
monetary policy. Specifically, between 1976 and 1982 the BoG set target values for both 
the rate of growth of M0, the currency in circulation, and the rate of growth of bank 
credit. Consequently, one might argue that after 1974 monetary policy in Greece has 
entered a new phase as the country moved from fixed exchange rate regime to a floating 
one and monetary targets replace exchange rate ones. A thorough investigation of the 
rigidities of the financial structure in the 1970s in Greece can be found Courakis (1981).  
 
In July 1982 the Currency Committee was dissolved by the new government and there 
was a new distribution of power between the government and the BoG. The latter had to 
implement policies designed by the former. The ‘crawling-peg’ exchange rate policy was 
continued and the drachma did not participate in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
of the European Monetary System (EMS) created in 1979. Two stabilization 
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programmes, both of which were accompanied by devaluations against the dollar, were 
announced in the 1980’s (in 1983 and 1985). The first one, in 1983, devalued the 
drachma by 15.5% against the US dollar as an attempt to: i) control the rising rate of 
inflation through the stabilisation of the exchange rate at a sustainable rate; and at the 
same time ii) stimulate the competitiveness of Greek products. This was proven to be 
unsuccessful and short-lived. The accumulation of problems and the structural 
imbalances initiated a new programme in 1985. A new devaluation of the drachma by 
15% was announced together with promises that credit expansion would be limited. The 
second programme introduced, amongst others, two important changes: the start of the 
process of financial liberalisation and a shift of the monetary policy towards price 
stability. 
 
In the beginning of the 90’s, the Maastricht treaty was signed and a strong anti-
inflationary policy was adopted by all the sub-sequent governments, conservatives and 
socialists, in order to meet the criteria of the treaty (see Bratsiotis, 2000 for the 
“metamorphosis” of the socialist party). A policy of reforms, financial liberalisation 
combined with the strong drachma policy1 led to the reduction of inflation. A detailed 
discussion on the recent monetary and economic history can be found in Alogoskoufis 
(1995), Alogoskoufis and Lazaretou (1997), Courakis (1981) and Mourmouras and 
Argyrou (2000). 
 
As a result, at least four different regimes could be identified. The first one would be 
before the participation in the Bretton Woods system of exchange rates. The second one  
would be during the Bretton Woods system, a period characterised by low inflation and 
monetary stability. The third one would be the period after the fall of Bretton Woods 
when a flexible exchange rate system was in place. The last regime would start with the 
Maastricht treaty when the main goal of the monetary policy was price stability. 
 
                                                 
1 The rate of depreciation of the drachma against the ECU was smaller than the inflation differential 
between Greece and the rest of the EU countries. 
Loughborough University Dept. of  Economics Discussion Paper Series N. 2005/7
 6 
3. MEASURES OF THE LEGAL INDEPENDENCE OF CENTRAL BANKS 
LEGAL INDEX 
 
The Index of Legal Independence for Greece denoted as (LegalCBI) was formulated 
following CWN. Only written information from the Bank’s charters was used and the 
focus is the degree of independence the legislators intended to allocate to the Bank. The 
four main clusters in which the relevant legal characteristics of the Bank can be classified 
are the following: 
 
• The appointment, dismissal and term of office of the chief executive officer of the 
Bank, commonly called the Governor. 
• The policy-formulation cluster, which concerns the resolution of possible conflicts 
between the executive branch (government) and the Central Bank over monetary 
policy, as well as the participation of the Bank in the budget process. 
• The objectives of the CB. 
• Limitations on the ability of the CB to lend to the public sector (limits on volume, 
maturity, interest rates and conditions on direct advances and lending). 
 
From those four clusters, 16 variables of Legal Independence were generated, coded on a 
scale between 0 (lowest level of independence) and 1 (highest level of independence). 
For more information on the formulation of the Legal Independence Index see the 
discussion in CWN. 
 
The values of LegalCBI from 1950 to 1989 are obtained from CWN and following the 
same categorization and weighting, values for the next decade were generated (see Figure 
1). The procedure of generating these values involved separating the period under 
consideration in three sub-periods, which are; 1990 to 1994; 1995 to 1997 and 1998 to 
1999. As mentioned already, in order to reflect the legal mandate that the Central Bank 
possesses, only information included in the Bank’s charter was included. The subperiods 
chosen correspond to the time points at which a reform of the legal status of the Bank 
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took place. This implies that the years related to each sub-period exhibit the same 
characteristics and therefore exhibit the same value. 
 
However, it should be noted that the reform of 1994 abolished the rights of the Bank to 
provide the government with any kind of advances or lending. This fact has had an 
important impact on the way that the Legal Index was measured (see Figure 1- Legal 
Central Bank Independence). Following CWN, the 16 sub-indices were aggregated in one 
single Legal Independence Index. 
 
TURNOVER OF CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR 
 
This index is considered by CWN as an informal indicator of actual independence. This 
concept is based on the assumption that a more frequent turnover of Central Bank 
Governors –possibly- creates dependence on the political authorities. It may, actually, 
indicate the possibility of the Government dismissing whoever is not consistent with its 
own objectives -including political objectives. In such a case, the Governor may be 
discouraged from applying a long-term policy.  
 
Accordingly, a more rapid turnover of the Governor is considered to indicate a lower 
level of independence. Nevertheless, a low turnover does not necessarily imply a higher 
level of CBI. The turnover rate (TOR) actually indicates the average tenure of the 
Governor measured in years. Given that the majority of the countries -including Greece- 
have an electoral cycle of at least four years, it seems plausible to accept this as a critical 
range for the turnover. Above this value independence declines seriously, such as a value 
between 0.2 and 0.25 changes per year. This is related to an average tenure of four to five 
years. 
 
Just as in the case of the Legal Independence variable, the data related to the Turnover 
variable up to year 1989 were drawn from CWN and the values from 1990 to 1999 were 
generated by observing the frequency of the Governor’s turnover. For that purpose 
information contained in the Annual Statistical Bulletin of the Bank of Greece was used. 
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More specifically, the turnover rate for those years was found by applying the following 
simple formula: 
 
Average Annual Turnover Rate = Number of years /Number of Governor changes 
 
The values indicate an average annual turnover rate for the decade, which is measured in 
years. The outcome corresponding to the decade is then assigned to each year included in 
the sample sub-period. As already mentioned, a value exceeding the critical range of 0.2 
to 0.25 indicates lower independence of the central bank. Based on our estimates, the 
values for Greece range between 0.1 and 0.38, half of the time exceeding the critical 
value. 
 
THE INFLATION VARIABLE 
 
To reduce heteroscedasticity of the error term and improve the efficiency of the model, a 
transformation of the inflation variable was adopted. The new variable, I, represents the 
annual real depreciation of a given amount of money, which is given by: 
 
 π
π
+= 1I      (1)  
 
where π is the inflation rate and I is the transformed inflation rate (taking values from 0 
to1). The inflation rate was measured as the annual percentage change in the CPI, which 
was drawn from the United Nations Statistical Yearbook (the base year being 1980). 
 
Four dummy variables are also employed in order to capture the different policy regimes 
during this five decades period. The first dummy variable (called BBW, Before Bretton 
Woods) captures the period before the 1953 devaluation of the drachma (value 1 from 
1951 to 1953 and 0 afterwards). The second dummy (called BW, Bretton Woods) would 
represent the period after the 1953 devaluation of the drachma and up to 1973. During 
Loughborough University Dept. of  Economics Discussion Paper Series N. 2005/7
 9 
this period Greece successfully participated in the fixed exchange rate mechanism 
established by Bretton Woods. The third dummy (called FE, Flexible Exchange Rate 
Mechanism) captures the period after the restoration of democracy in 1974 up to 1991 
before the Maastricht treaty was signed. The last dummy (called MA, Maastricht) runs 
from 1992 to 1999 in order to represent the different policy regime after the Maastricht 
treaty was signed. These variables have the default value 0 except in the particular years 
where they take the value of 1. 
 
Having gathered all the information and constructed the variables our next steps are as 
follows: 
i) We calculate the correlation between the two indices of central bank 
independence (LegalCBI and TOR). 
ii) We then estimate the following model, to investigate the relationship between 
inflation, LegalCBI and TOR: 
 4
1t t t i i ti
I LegalCBI TOR DUMMYα β γ ε== + + +∑  (2) 
iii) Next, we examine whether our proxies for central bank independence and the 
dummies affect the variability of inflation 
iv) Finally, we explore the direction of the causality. Does LegalCBI Granger 
cause inflation or is it the other way around?  
 
4. RESULTS 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDICES OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
Table 1 shows the rank correlation between indices of central bank independence: the 
legal index and the turnover rate. The two indices (LegalCBI and TOR) seem to be 
correlated, and thus could be employed in order to obtain a better measure of overall 
central bank independence.  
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TABLE 1:SPEARMAN’S CORRELATION BETWEEN THE LEGAL INDEX AND THE RATE OF TURNOVER 
Correlation pair  
LegalCBI and TOR 0.481 
Coefficient sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 
Observations 50 
 
INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE 
 
Do countries with more independent central banks have lower rates of inflation? The 
hypothesis that inflation should be negatively related to the legal variable has two bases. 
First, there is the presumption that central banks are more concerned about price stability 
compared to political authorities (see e.g. Rogoff 1985). A more independent central 
bank will have a stronger impact on actual policy and a more persistent anti-inflationary 
policy since the latter is normally the outcome of a compromise between the central bank 
and the government. Secondly, legal independence is intentionally structured to reflect, 
among other things, the extent to which the central bank has an explicit mandate to 
pursue price stability at the expense of other objectives. The legal independence of the 
central bank is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for low inflation although, 
other things being equal, we would expect less legal independence to contribute to higher 
inflation. 
The transformed inflation variable takes values between 0 and 1 and consequently is 
bounded by definition. The same holds for the other two variables: the aggregate legal 
index and the rate of turnover. In order to reinforce our point, we carry out the recently 
proposed unit root test by Ng and Perron (2001): 
 
TABLE 2: UNIT ROOT TEST FOR THE TRANSFORMED INFLATION 
MZa MZt
Ng-Perron test Statistics -5.933 -1.643
Asymptotic critical values 5% -8.100 -1.980
10% -5.700 -1.620
 
 
We were able to accept the hypothesis that the transformed inflation is stationary at the 
10% significance level. 
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Table 3 presents the regression of the transformed inflation rate (I) on the aggregate 
variable of legal central bank independence (LegalCBI), the turnover rate (TOR) and the 
four dummy variables. 
 
TABLE 3: MODEL 1 AND DIAGNOSTICS  
I = -0.136 LegalCBI + 0.11 TOR + 0.144 BBW +0.0949 BW +0.198 FE + 0.138MA 
      (0.082)*  (0.072)          (0.05)***     (0.044)***   (0.049)*** (0.064)*** 
 
R2   0.75  Adjusted R2  0.72  Jarque-Berra  6.752 [0.034] 
F ar   6.007  [0.005] F het   1.95 [0.072]  F arch  0.36  [0.546] 
McLeod-Li  15.96 [0.719] AIC  -3.829  
Note: The numbers in ( ) are the standard errors. F ar is the LM F-test for serial correlation of up to second 
order. F het is an F test for heteroscedasticity. F arch is the second order ARCH F test. Numbers in [ ] are 
the p-values of the test statistics. The statistic proposed by McLeod-Li (1983) tests the null hypothesis that 
the residuals of this model are an IID. process. The probability using up to 20 lags is reported in [ ]. AIC is 
the Akaike Information Criterion. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at 
the 1% level. 
 
The aggregate legal variable has a statistically significant coefficient at the 10% 
significance level with the predicted negative sign; laws seem to make a difference. The 
negative sign implies an inverse relationship between the aggregate legal index and the 
transformed inflation: the more independent a central bank is, the lower the inflation. The 
turnover rate has a statistically insignificant coefficient (Prob 0.13). However, the 
rejection of the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero is only marginal at the 10% 
significance level and therefore there is high probability of a Type II error. It has also the 
predicted positive sign: frequent changes of the governor of the Central Bank create 
instability, which results in higher inflation. Both explanatory variables have the 
predicted sign but only one is statistically significant at the 10% significance level. All 
dummy variables have a positive coefficient and are statistically significant at the 1% 
S.L., capturing the different policy regimes. The BW dummy has the lowest coefficient 
reflecting the low inflation of the period between 1953 and 1974. The second smallest 
coefficient is found in the period after the Maastricht treaty, from 1992 to 1999. 
 
The value of R2 is high, indicating that 75% of the variation of the transformed inflation 
can be explained by the variation of the independent variables. The Jarque-Bera statistic 
tests whether the series is normally distributed. The null hypothesis of a normal 
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distribution (Prob. 0.034) could be accepted. Additionally, the hypothesis that 
heteroscedasticity is present in the residuals is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that higher order serial correlation is present in the 
residuals. No evidence is found to support the hypothesis that ARCH type of structure is 
present in the residuals (All tests were estimated for two lags). Also, a McLeod-Li test 
with 20 degrees of freedom was carried out on the residuals of the model. The calculated 
test statistic is 15.96, which provides strong evidence in favour of the null hypothesis that 
the series comprises IID (Identically Independently Distributed) random variables. 
Overall, most of the diagnostic tests suggest that the model is able to explain the 
behaviour of the transformed inflation. 
 
The negative relationship between inflation and legal independence is mentioned in 
CWN as a characteristic of industrial countries. In this study Greece is characterised as a 
developing country. However, the evidence suggests that at least one characteristic of a 
developed economy was found: the negative correlation between the LegalCBI index and 
inflation. 
On the other hand, the coefficient of the rate of turnover is positive as expected, but not 
statistically significant. The positive relationship between inflation and the turnover rate 
is also mentioned by CWN as a characteristic of developing countries. The evidence 
based on TOR supports their characterisation for Greece as a developing country as far as 
this aspect is concerned. However, the positive relationship is not found to be statistically 
significant.  
To sum up, it is found that legal independence is systematically and inversely related to 
inflation. It is also related to the actual frequency of change of the Governor in a positive 
but not significant way. In the case of Greece, the evidence suggests that an independent 
central bank and a long living governor would result in a lower inflation. 
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TABLE 4: MODEL 2 AND DIAGNOSTICS 
I=-0.128LegalCBI + 0.151BBW + 0.102BW + 0.224FE + 0.165MA 
     (0.0836)*             (0 .050)***   (0.044)***  (0.046)*** (0.062)*** 
 
R2   0.74  Adjusted R2  0.71  Jarque-Berra  22.42 [0.00] 
F ar   5.907 [0.005] F het   0.957 [0.474]  F arch   0.256 [0.774] 
McLeod-Li  19.75 [0.474] AIC  -3.818 
 
In Table 4, an alternative model is presented. TOR is not included as it was found to be 
statistically insignificant. The picture does not change. The negative relationship between 
LegalCBI and inflation is confirmed. However, a comparison of the adjusted R2 and the 
AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), suggest that Model 1 is preferable. 
 
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE VARIABILITY OF INFLATION 
 
Variability of inflation imposes economic costs. Indeed, many of the costs of high 
inflation arise because it is usually more variable and uncertain when the average is high. 
Based on the preceding discussion, we would also expect that inflation would vary when 
the central bank is less independent. It is therefore important to investigate whether our 
proxies for central bank independence actually affect the variability of inflation. 
As a measure of inflation variability, we take the standard deviation of  
[ ]2ddSD ii −=  
where di is the transformed inflation for i = 1,…,50. 
 
TABLE 5: MODEL 3 AND DIAGNOSTICS 
SD = 0.04 LegalCBI + 0.042BW +0.042FE 
 (0.011)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** 
 
R2  0.31  Adjusted R2  0.28  Jarque-Berra 0.367 [0.831] 
F ar   2.94 [0.06] F het  3.32 [0.01] F arch  2.95 [0.07] 
McLeod-Li  37.59 [0.011] AIC  -4.535 
 
Our preferred model is presented in Table 5. Keeping only the statistically significant 
variables and using two well known criteria, the AIC and the adjusted R2, it is found that 
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TOR and the Dummies BBW and MA are not contributing to explaining the variability of 
the dependent variable. 
Note that all coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The R2 is quite low 
and indicates that the proposed model can explain only 31% of the variation of the 
standard deviation of the transformed inflation. Furthermore, the residuals are normally 
distributed but the evidence to suggest that the residuals are IID is not very strong. Most 
of the diagnostics improve when a lagged value of SD is introduced as a dependent 
variable but other than that the results do not change. 
As a result, the variability of inflation can be explained by the aggregate legal index and 
two dummy variables, one for the period between 1953 and 1973, which represents the 
Bretton Woods period (BW) and another one, which represents the period between 1974 
and 1991 (FE). These two periods capture different features. The BW period is 
characterized by low inflation and the FE by high. The aggregate legal index is still an 
important variable, since it contributes significantly to explaining the variability of the 
transformed inflation. The coefficient is statistically significant but it does not have the 
predicted negative sign. However, this result is in line with the findings of CWN for 
developing countries (their coefficient was positive, but statistically insignificant). 
Although the aggregate legal index was found to contribute significantly in explaining the 
variability of the transformed inflation, a positive relationship between these two 
variables is uncovered, contrary to our expectations. The two dummy variables, BW and 
FE are also found to be significant in explaining the behaviour of SDi. 
 
TWO WAY CAUSALITY BETWEEN INFLATION AND CENTRAL BANK 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
As discussed in the previous part, legal independence is systematically and inversely 
related to inflation. But it could be possible that there is a two-way causality between 
inflation and the actual degree of central bank independence. Less independence 
contributes to higher inflation. However, high inflation is likely to result, at least after a 
while, in less independence. If inflation affects actual independence, we would expect it 
to affect the rate of turnover of governors also. 
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To investigate the causality between inflation and turnover of central bank governors, we 
perform a simple Granger causality test by estimating the bivariate autoregressive 
processes for inflation and turnover: 
ltltltltt xbxbyayaay −−−− +++++= ...... 11110   (3) 
ltltltltt ybybxaxaax −−−− ++++++= ...... 11110   (4) 
The reported F-statistics are the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis 
0...1 === lbb  
The null hypothesis is therefore that x does not Granger-cause y in the first regression and 
that y does not Granger-cause x in the second regression. 
 
TABLE 6 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1951 1999 - Lags: 3 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
Transformed Inflation does not Granger 
Cause Rate of turnover 
46  0.21834  0.88308 
Rate of turnover does not Granger Cause the 
Transformed Inflation 
 3.07246  0.03883 
 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the transformed inflation does not Granger cause the 
rate of turnover, but we do reject the hypothesis that the rate of turnover does not Grange 
causes the transformed inflation. Therefore it appears that Granger causality runs one-
way from the rate of turnover to the transformed inflation. A stable (and probably 
powerful) governor is associated with lower inflation. This evidence is not in line with 
the findings of the previous section for the significance of the turnover rate for a low 
inflation. 
On the other hand, there is no Granger causality between the transformed inflation and 
the aggregate legal index (Table 7). In both cases the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The same tests were carried out for 2, 4 and 5 lags. The results were not altered. 
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TABLE 7 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Sample: 1951 1999 – Lags: 3 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
Aggregate Legal Index does not Granger 
Cause Transformed Inflation 
46  0.81995  0.49076 
Transformed inflation does not Granger Cause 
Aggregate Legal Index 
 0.15913  0.92316 
 
In this last part, an important relationship between the rate of turnover and the 
transformed inflation is uncovered. It was found that Granger causality runs from rate of 
turnover to the transformed inflation. This finding is not in line with the previous results 
(see Table 3 and 4), where turnover rate was not found to be statistically significant.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The relationship between central bank independence and inflation in Greece is 
investigated in this paper. Several studies have recently discussed the theoretical and 
empirical aspects of this relationship. Although there is empirical evidence to suggest that 
countries with more independent central banks have lower inflation, others argue that 
CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for reaching monetary stability. Following a time 
series approach, we updated two proxies for CBI, LegalCBI and TOR, and use the last 
data available before Greece joined the Euro zone -the agreement was signed in 2000. 
Strong evidence is found to suggest that central bank independence is systematically and 
inversely related to the rate of inflation. The latter is also positively related to the 
turnover rate of the Governor of the Central Bank but this relationship was not found to 
be statistically significant. It follows that, in the case of Greece, a more independent 
central bank and less frequent changes of the Central Bank CEO lead to a lower rate of 
inflation. The LegalCBI index is also found significant for the variability of inflation. The 
systematic anti-inflationary policy followed in the 1990’s is confirmed by the results. The 
dummy variable introduced for this period was found statistically significant in all the 
cases. Another interesting finding is that TOR Granger causes inflation (one way 
causality). No evidence is found to suggest that there is a causality relationship between 
LegalCBI and the rate of inflation. 
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